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This article studies how a government should distribute funds among
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basic research to induce the most productive institutions to carry out
more applied research than they would like. Institutions with better
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1 Introduction
Government expenditure on scientific research in the OECD countries amounts
to around 0.8% of GDP, with peaks close or above 1% in the US, Sweden,
Austria and Korea (OECD 2013, NSF 2012). These large sums of taxpayers’
money are used to fund a wide variety of different institutions: public as well
as private universities, much of whose research is publicly funded, but also
dedicated research centres within the government and the armed forces, and
firms, non-profit and possibly other organisations, which receive direct sub-
sidies or tax incentives. This variety raises an immediate efficiency question.
How should the total funding be shared among institutions, given that their
reputation and potential for successful research may differ widely?
Also varied is the link between the funds provided and their use: in the UK,
roughly 2/3 of the total government funding is distributed to institutions in
consideration of past achievements, to spend as they see fit, the remaining 1/3
is grant funding, firmly linked to specific research projects. Is this proportion
right, or would it be possible to re-allocate funding from one spending method
to another and improve its impact on society? Moreover, grant funding is
more concentrated: the top 25 UK universities received 85% of the aggregate
research grant funding, and only 75% of the total quality related funding. Is
this difference justified?
Along with the characteristics of the recipients and the mechanics of its
funding, research also varies according to its nature, applied or basic. Some
research benefits society in a concrete and tangible way; other research im-
proves the “scientific climate” in society without an identifiable explicit ben-
efit. Clearly there is a degree of arbitrariness in any binary attribution, and
exceptions and special cases can always be found, but both the agencies –
such as the US National Science Foundation – whose job it is to classify re-
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search into “applied” and “basic”, and the existing academic literature see ba-
sic research (or fundamental, pure, curiosity-driven, upstream, unpredictable,
Strandburg 2005) as driven by scientists’ curiosity, its aim to acquire knowl-
edge for knowledge’s sake, unlike applied research, which is instead designed
to solve well-defined practical problems.1 Developed countries spend around
one fifth of their R&D expenditure on basic research (Gersbach 2009). Is this
a “good” ratio? More generally, should funding agencies be concerned with
the nature, basic or applied, of the research carried out, or should they leave
the choice to the institutions, which, after all, know more about research?
These are important questions, and yet the topic is barely touched in the
literature. In this article, I aim to help fill this gap, and to provide a theoretical
framework to address them: my intention here is to lay the foundations for a
theory of the optimal public funding of research.
My approach is microeconomic: I leave the macroeconomic aspect of total
spending in the background, and concentrate instead on the balance between
basic and applied research and on the distribution of funding among differ-
ent research institutions. I build a model based on two broad assumptions.
Firstly, the government’s and the institutions’ preferences regarding the type
of research to be carried out are not perfectly aligned. Institutions care about
their prestige and reputation, and because both applied and basic research
are recognised in the research community, lead to prestigious publications,
and may win prizes and awards, institutions do not typically favour one kind
over the other. Although the government is conscious that both basic and
applied are necessary, at the margin it has a preference for applied, “useful”
1The National Science Foundation defines “basic research [...] as systematic study di-
rected toward fuller knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena
and of observable facts without specific applications towards processes or products in mind.”
Conversely, “applied research is defined as systematic study to gain knowledge or under-
standing necessary to determine the means by which a recognized and specific need may be
met” (NSB 2008).
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research, which has a direct measurable impact on quality of life and national
income.
Misalignment of preferences affects policy when there is also asymmetric
information, and my second assumption is that institutions have more pre-
cise information than the government as to their relative ability to carry out
basic and applied research. This better knowledge of their strengths and weak-
nesses gives an information advantage to the institutions that are relatively
more productive in applied research, the kind of research preferred by the
government. In line with the standard principal-agent set-up, this superior
knowledge translates into informational rent and causes a distortion.
I show in Proposition 1 that if institutions’ technology were observable, the
government would allocate research funding in such a way that the marginal
cost of applied research is the same for all institutions, irrespective of their
efficiency and of their reputation. This is natural: were it not so, the govern-
ment could reallocate funding and reduce the overall cost of a given aggregate
amount of applied research.
However, if an institution’s productivity is private information, the gov-
ernment is unable to enforce this policy, and, as shown in Proposition 3, the
interplay between preference misalignment and the institutions’ information
advantage causes a distortion. At the optimal second best policy, which is im-
plemented with the offer of funding contracts based on the amount of applied
research to be carried out, the marginal cost of applied research is higher in
the institutions which are more efficient at it. This is inefficient, these insti-
tutions do too much applied research, and welfare would be higher if applied
research could be reallocated to less efficient institutions. This second best
policy is implemented by offering incentive funding to institutions willing to
carry out higher levels of applied research; institutions which accept this in-
centive funding spend it on basic research. Thus, in the second best, basic
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and applied research are positively correlated across institutions, even in the
absence of any modelling assumption imposing this. This is in line with ca-
sual observation: for example, if one proxies the amount of applied research
carried out with the number of patents granted to an institution, and the total
of basic and applied research with the number of faculties who are members
or fellows of learned institutions and academies,2 then, with values of the pa-
rameters chosen to match data from the US patents office and the NSF, the
correlation between basic and applied research carried out by the top 200 US
universities from 1989 to 2011 ranges between 0.272 and 0.587. Also tallying
with stylised empirical facts is the result that, at the second best research
policy, publicly funded institutions have a minimum size. This is not due to
economies to scale, which again are ruled out by assumption, but is a conse-
quence of asymmetric information: at the first best some institutions receive
a vanishing small amount to pay for applied research.
In addition to their efficiency, institutions differ according to their pres-
tige and reputation. Reputation being by its very nature observable, funding
can be made conditional on it, even though it does not per se affect research
prowess. Proposition 4 shows that, with the plausible assumption that in-
stitutions which are good at research are more likely to be found among the
prestigious ones, the optimal second best policy is such that funding is bi-
ased towards institutions with better reputation: given two equally efficient
institutions, the one with better reputation receives more funding and does
more research. This policy implication of my theoretical model matches the
practice of some countries to skew research funding towards high reputation
institutions. Taken together, Propositions 3 and 4 show that the informa-
tion disadvantage of the government leads applied research to be inefficiently
2Such as the National Academy of Sciences or of Engineering or the Institute of Medicine,
see Capaldi Phillips et al (2013), for details.
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over-concentrated in the most efficient institutions and in those with a bet-
ter reputation. To the extent that more research leads to better reputation,
then reputation and prestige are self-perpetuating in the optimal second best
funding mechanism.
The theoretical analysis of the article can also contribute to the design of
policy in respect of funding mechanisms used in practice by showing how the
optimal funding can be implemented. In the second best policy I derive, a dual
funding system suggests itself naturally: all institutions receive an identical
“block grant”, as long as they carry out a threshold level of applied research.
The least efficient institutions which receive this “block grant” spend it all on
the applied research they must do to qualify for any funding, and so do no basic
research. More efficient institutions, which can fund this minimum amount of
applied research by spending less than the block grant, can therefore use this
difference to engage in basic research, which, at their chosen point on the menu
of contracts, they prefer to applied research. Additional financial resources
are made available to institutions through a second funding channel, which,
like research grant funding in practice, is linked to specific research projects.
To become eligible to apply for these funds, an institution must meet a target
of applied research funded with its own block grant. This target is lower for
higher reputation institutions, which are therefore treated more favourably
in the government’s second best policy. Interestingly, the additional funding
is lower than the cost of the additional applied research to be carried out:
institutions need to “co-fund” the applied research grants they obtain. This
is in contrast to the “cost-plus” approach, labelled “full economic costing”,
adopted by funding agencies in the UK and elsewhere, which typically award
research grants to cover not only the full marginal cost but also a share of the
institution’s fixed costs.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and
5
Section 3 the results. Section 4 shows how the policy can be implemented in
practice; some additional remarks are in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
Mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
Private benefits and cost of research
I model the publicly funded research sector of an economy. A continuum of
research institutions compete to be the recipients of this funding. Institu-
tions differ along two dimensions: their reputation and their ability to spend
research funding efficiently. In practice, of course, the reputation and the re-
search efficiency of a research institution change as time passes, but in this
article I concentrate on the short term static problem of allocating research
funding to institutions of given reputation and efficiency.
The capacity to carry out research efficiently is measured by a technology
parameter θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] ⊆ R++, ordered so that “better” institutions have lower
θ. As an example, one can think of θ as the ratio of failed to successful
research projects: an institution with low θ is efficient in the specific sense
that, perhaps because of the ability of its scientists and the quality of its
research environment, it is more capable of assessing ex-ante the chances of
success of a project, and so relatively few of its projects turn out to be flops.
Reputation is naturally an ordinal concept: it does not have an objective
measure, but we can say that an institution has a better or worse reputation
than another.3 To capture this idea formally, I posit that institutions are
3A good reputation may follow from the membership of formal clubs, the UK “Russell
group”, or the attribution of informal labels, the top twenty or the Ivy league universities, or
the position achieved in the ubiquitous rankings for universities and research institutions,
such as the SCImago Ranking, and those prepared by government agencies, such as the
RAE/REF classification for the UK universities.
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classified into N “reputation” groups, which are fixed within the time frame
considered.
An institution’s reputation does not affect directly the efficiency with
which it carries out research, though it conveys information about this ef-
ficiency: an institution with a higher reputation is more likely to be efficient.
Formally, I assume that, in each period, the value of θ for an institution
with reputation i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is drawn from a differentiable distribution
function Fi (θ), with density fi (θ) = F
′
i (θ) > 0, and monotonic hazard rate
d
dθ
(
Fi(θ)
fi(θ)
)
> 0 for θ ∈ (θ, θ¯), i = 1, . . . , N ,4 and I capture the correlation
between efficiency and reputation with the following.
Assumption 1 For any h, ` ∈ {1, . . . , N}, with h > `, F` (θ) < Fh (θ) for
θ ∈ (θ, θ¯); that is, F` (θ) strictly5 first order stochastically dominates Fh (θ).
Assumption 1 would follow from the natural idea that scientists like to
have able scientists as colleagues, and that, when they consider job offers,
they proxy the quality of the scientists an institution currently employs with
its reputation. Thus a high reputation institution will find it easier to attract
good scientists, and hence to draw a low θ, than one with a less established
reputation.6 A further channel would be at work if θ is affected by an in-
stitution’s ability to supplement government funding with funds from private
sources. To the extent that some of these, such as income from endowments,
or, for universities, alumni donations and students’ tuition fees, are larger
4Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) discuss at length the properties of these functions, and
give numerous examples which show that most commonly used distribution functions do
satisfy the monotonic hazard rate property.
5The assumption could be weakened by allowing strict first order stochastic dominance
only over a range. This would add only slightly longer statements of results, with no
additional insight.
6A similar externality is in Palomino and Sa´kovics’s (2004) model, where institutions
(sports leagues in their article) compete with each other, and their members (the individual
teams) prefer to belong to leagues with better teams.
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in prestigious institutions, this strengthens the correlation between i and θ.
Other sources of private sector funding, like the commercial exploitation of re-
search,7 are probably less closely linked to reputation. Given the result of this
article that, at the optimal second best policy, high reputation institutions
do ceteris paribus more research, this creates a “multiplier” effect for current
research investment: Assumption 1 would thus be naturally incorporated in a
fully-fledged formal dynamic model where current research success enhances
future reputation.
I assume that the payoff of research institutions is an increasing function
of the amount of research they carry out in the current period. This again is a
reduced form simplification for a richer dynamic set-up where institutions care
about the present value of current and expected future research. If current
research enhances reputation and, through this, future payoff, then success
begets success and current and future research are complements, so there is
no intertemporal trade-off, making this a plausible simplification. The exact
link between current research and the present value of an institution’s payoff,
which depends in general on the link between current research success and
future reputation, and on the institution’s discount factor and risk tolerance,
can be left in the background, captured by a monotonic function of the current
research, which I normalise to the identity without further loss of generality.
An important decision institutions take is the type of research they carry
out. The focus of the article is on the choice between applied and basic
research. I assume that institutions are indifferent between them. This is
because they care about repute, publications in prestigious journals and other
7Since the Bayh-Dole Act, in 1980, US institutions may patent federally funded inven-
tions (Thursby and Thursby 2003 for a detailed analysis), and the income they earn can be
substantial: at the upper end, in 2010 MIT earned over 80 million dollars through its li-
censing office. Recent work suggests that the effect is petering out (Leydesdorff and Meyer
2010). Other countries have systems in place similarly aiming to encourage patentable
research in universities (Mowery and Sampat 2005).
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signifiers of success, such as prizes and honours bestowed on its members, and
these are all brought equally by basic and by applied successful research.
To sum up, an institution’s payoff function can be written as
ri (θ) = ai (θ) + bi (θ) , i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
where the link is made explicit between an institution’s type, θ, its reputation
i, and the amount of applied and basic research it carries out, ai (θ) and bi (θ)
respectively, and their sum, ri (θ). The latter is therefore both the rent
8 of
institution of type θ and reputation i, and the total amount of research it
carries out. An institution maximises (1) subject to the constraints imposed
by the government agency. As well as being a static reduced form proxying
a richer intertemporal payoff function, (1) is restrictive as it rules out both
a preference, positive or negative, for variety, and differences in the marginal
rate of substitution between basic and applied research which depend on an
institution’s type, θ, or reputation, i. My analysis should therefore be seen as
the benchmark case where these assumptions hold.
Institutions use government funding to pay for their research.9 Thus they
maximise (1) subject to their current total cost not exceeding their current
funding. Given my interpretation of θ, given above, any private funding re-
ceived by an institution is included in θ.
I turn next to technology.
8ri (θ) could thus be denoted by Ui (θ) as in some of the mechanism design literature.
9This being a static model, current funding pays for current research, as shown in Figure
1 below. In a fuller dynamic model, this would be the consequence of institutions not having
access to capital markets, which would imply that they must spend all the government
funding in the period they receive it.
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Define B as the total amount of basic research carried out in the economy.
B =
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θ¯
θ
bi (θ) fi (θ) dθ, (2)
where qi > 0 is the number of institutions in reputation group i, i = 1, . . . , n.
I assume that B affects an institution’s cost of doing applied research. The
way I model this influence captures three of the characteristics attributed in
the literature to basic research. First, the hierarchical link between basic and
applied research, with the former preceding and providing the foundation to
the latter (for example, Evenson and Kislev 1976, or more recently Aghion
et al 2008). Next, the externality bestowed on society by basic research:
basic research reduces the cost of applied research, and it is the latter that
has direct beneficial effects, as posited below, in Section 2. And third, the
unpredictable nature of the benefits arising from basic research. Each applied
research project is, in expectation, helped equally by every basic research
project: it is the very nature of basic research that makes it it is hard to
pinpoint ex-ante what kind of benefits a given basic research project will
bring if successful.
Nelson’s early work (1959) already reports many examples of basic research
projects which illustrate these characteristics. Among the cases studied more
recently, Moody (1995) describes in detail the numerous strands of basic re-
search which allowed the creation of the ubiquitous CD. A GPS navigation
system would be far too inaccurate to be of any practical use without cor-
rections of gravitational effects central to the theory of relativity (Haustein
2009). The abstract mathematical problem of covering a surface with tiles lies
at the foundation of our understanding and exploitation of superconductors
(Edelson 1992). Gauss’s investigation into the distribution of prime numbers
has led, with the contributions of some of the best mathematical minds over
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the course of two centuries, to the possibility of unbreakable cryptographic
codes, without which e-commerce would not be possible (du Satoy 2003).10
The hierarchical structure, the externality and the unpredictability are
captured by the assumption that only the total amount of basic research un-
dertaken in society, determined by (2), affects an institution’s cost of applied
research.11 A further justification for this is the scientists’ incentives to make
their discoveries known as quickly and as widely as possible and the limited
appropriability of basic research, exemplified by the difficulty of patenting ba-
sic research discoveries. Thus the new knowledge embodied in basic research
carried out in one institution is instantaneously diffused to the entire research
community, and therefore all institutions benefit equally from it. In other
words, an institution is unable to appropriate any of the externality bestowed
by the basic research it carries out other than through its effect on the aggre-
gate amount B. Mathematically, this can be captured by the assumption that
the cost function is separable in the amounts of applied research, a, and basic
research, b. In addition, I also assume that it is linear in b, which, as we see
below, is convenient as it ensures that the model follows the standard mecha-
nism design with monetary transfers.12 There is no further loss of generality
in normalising the coefficient of b to 1, and so an institution’s total cost of
10Table 3 in Amon et al (2010) has a longer and more systematic list, and Stephan (2012)
discusses further examples. The benefit of hindsight, of course, makes apparent the link
between basic research and commercial applications of the applied research it generated
(eg, Jensen and Thursby 2001).
11This is similar to Gersbach et al (2010), who posit that aggregate amount of basic
research undertaken in society is a parameter of the function which gives the probability of
a successful innovation in each of the continuum of industries where research is undertaken.
12The assumption that cost is linear in b is a notationally simple way of capturing the
substantive assumption that, given that caa (·) > 0, the marginal cost function for applied
research is increasing at a faster rate than the marginal cost function for basic research.
This implies that the optimal policy matches the stylised observation that funding agencies
appear to have, at the margin, a stronger preference for applied research than the research
institutions themselves.
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carrying out a applied research and b basic research can be written as:
c (a, θ, B) + b. (3)
I impose the following restrictions on the cost function; here and in the rest
of the article the partial derivatives of a function are denoted by subscripts.
Assumption 2 An institution’s total cost is given by (3). For every a,B > 0,
for every θ ∈ [θ, θ¯), the function c (a, θ, B) satisfies:13
1. (i) ca (·) > 0, (ii) cθ (·) > 0, (iii) cB (·) < 0.
2. (i) caa (·) > 0, (ii) cBB (·) > 0, (iii) caθ (·) > 0, (iv) caB (·) 6 0.
3. (i) c (0, θ, B) = 0; (ii) limB→0 cB (a, θ, B) = −∞.
4. limθ→θ¯ ca (0, θ, B) = +∞.
Naturally, an institution’s total cost (3) increases with a, b, and θ, and
decreases with B, the last capturing the externality discussed above. Given
θ, reputation does not affect cost: as explained above, it affects the likelihood
of a good θ, which in turn reduces cost. Moreover, the marginal cost of
applied research increases with θ, see Assumption 2.2.(iii). As the marginal
cost of basic research is independent of θ, this implies that better (ie lower
θ) institutions have a comparative advantage in applied research.14 This is
a natural consequence of my interpretation of θ as an institution’s capacity
13An example of a functional form satisfying Assumption 2 is a(a+1)θ
h(B)(θ¯−θ) , where h (B)
satisfies h (0) = 0, h′ (B) > 0, h′′ (B) < 0, and limB→∞ h (B) > θ¯; one such h (B) is θ¯B1+B .
14In an earlier version of the article (De Fraja 2011), the marginal cost of basic research
was also an increasing function of θ: this is the case where better institution have an
absolute advantage in basic research, as well as a comparative advantage. All the results
of the present version are maintained, provided that, loosely speaking, the marginal cost of
applied research increases faster with θ than the marginal cost of basic research.
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to tell good research projects from poor ones, and of the plausible fact that,
given their less specific and more serendipitous nature, the expected benefits of
basic research projects are harder to assess than those of applied ones. Several
results in this article hinge on the assumption of comparative advantages in
applied research for better institutions; in view of the fact that there are, as
far as I am aware, no empirical results clarifying whether this is true or not,
this article indicates as an avenue for further research the determination of
comparative advantages in basic and applied research.
The sign of cBθ (·) is unrestricted: a positive sign indicates that efficient in-
stitutions can make more of the synergies between basic and applied research,
and so benefit more from an increase in total basic research. In practice, the
sign of this relationship is not obvious, but my results do not depend on this
detail. As for the remaining restrictions, Assumption 2.2.(ii) posits, naturally,
decreasing returns to scale for basic research; Assumption, 2.3.(i) rules out
fixed costs, and 2.3.(ii) is an Inada condition which avoids unrewarding cor-
ner solutions by ensuring that if there is no basic research in society then a
very small amount reduces the cost of research by more than it costs. Finally,
Assumption, 2.4 is a “free entry from the bottom” condition: it ensures that
there are potential institutions, whose efficiency parameter is just not ade-
quate, but which would be willing to carry out applied research following a
small improvement in their cost, for example following an increase in B. This
is formalised in Definition 1 below.
Social benefits and cost of research
The aggregate amount of applied research is
A =
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θ¯
θ
ai (θ) fi (θ) dθ. (4)
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Recall that ai (θ) is the amount of applied research carried out in institutions
with reputation i and efficiency parameter θ. A is assumed to affect directly
national income, Y , and so I write:
Y (A) , with Y ′ (A) > 0, Y ′′ (A) 6 0. (5)
A is therefore the Solow residual at the cornerstone of the basic model of eco-
nomic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). The idea conveyed by (4) and
(5) is that applied research successfully carried out by institutions, translates,
perhaps stochastically, into increases in total factor productivity, A. This
formulation is general enough to allow for a feedback from applied to basic
research, so that the cost of basic research is reduced if more applied research
is carried out. Given the microeconomic focus of the article, this feedback can
be left implicit in the functional shape of the Solow residual (5).
Unlike applied research, basic research has no direct effect on national in-
come, only the indirect effect on the individual institutions’ cost of carrying
out applied research through the mechanism subsumed in (3). The external-
ities implied in (3) and (5) do not create the appropriability problems which
beset R&D activities carried out in profit maximising firms, well-understood
by the literature since at least Arrow (1962). This is both because all effects
of research are internal to the government, which funds it,15 and because in-
dividuals and institutions doing research are not concerned with its monetary
appropriability: their reward is the production of knowledge, not its financial
exploitation, as has long been recognised (see Stephan 1996 for a comprehen-
sive review). In other words, from the decision makers’ point of view, both
15In an international context, some of the benefits determined by the expenditure of one
country’s taxpayers’ money do accrue to different countries. This can be captured by re-
interpreting some of the parameters that measure the benefit of research or the shadow cost
of public funds, λ and k in (6), to take this international spillover into account.
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the government and the institutions, the value of a given project a is the same
for a fully appropriable one, for example the development of a new therapy
by a private profit-making pharmaceutical company receiving a government
research subsidy, or a university selling a patent through a Technology Trans-
fers Office,16 or one with more diffuse benefits, such as an improvement in
communication technology, which benefits all firms and consumers.
The government’s objective function is the total national income (5), re-
duced by the cost of funding research, and increased by a direct benefit of
research. In analogy with the static point of view taken with regard to insti-
tutions, I assume that the government maximises the current value of its payoff
function. This separates the government intertemporal optimisation, whose
nature is macroeconomic, from the analysis of the article, which I focus on
the microeconomic aspects of the allocation of funds to different institutions.
The total taxes T necessary to fund the research sector, are simply equal
to the total cost of research: T =
∑N
i=1 qi
∫ θ¯
θ
[c (ai (θ) , θ, B) + bi (θ)] fi (θ) dθ.
The social cost of the tax collected must be increased by the distortionary and
administrative costs they cause, assumed as standard to be proportional to
λ > 0, the shadow cost of public funds, determined elsewhere in the economy.
Research has a direct benefit as well, measured by k ∈ R. This may
originate from several sources. Firstly, the government may include the insti-
tutions’ current aggregate payoff in its own payoff function: given (1), (2), and
(4) this is proportional to A+B. Secondly, k may capture the country’s pride
at the international prestige for conducting successful research, and similar
less tangible benefits. In addition, k may be a reduced form way to describe
the future benefits of any advancement in knowledge brought about by cur-
rent research. It is worth stressing that all the results hold if k = 0, that
16The analysis of the role and effects of TTOs, outside the scope of this article, can be
found for example, in Macho-Stadler et al (2007) and in the references reported there.
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is if the government cares only about the current national income net of the
cost of funding research. k could even be negative, indicating a “philistine”
government: my results imply that such a government would tolerate, indeed
fund research, both applied and basic.17
In sum, the government’s payoff function is
Y (A)− (1 + λ)T + k (A+B) . (6)
The shadow cost of taxation cannot be too high relative to the benefit of
research, or else no research will be funded, and cannot be too low, otherwise
it would be exceeded by the non-monetary benefit of research, pushing research
to infinity. Formally, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 3 For every A > 0, k < 1 + λ < Y ′ (A) + k.
The viewpoint of this article is normative: the government views research
funding as an investment and so it maximises its payoff function (6) by choice
of its research funding policy. This is the offer, available to all potential
research institutions, of contracts which link the amount of research, basic
and applied, carried out by an institution and the funding provided by the
government to that institution: reputation being observable, this link can be
made dependent on it. In designing its policy, the government must of course
obey its technological and informational constraints. After the government
has announced the policy and committed to it, institutions choose their basic
and applied research, and receive the corresponding funding. Figure 1 depicts
schematically the sequence of the events described in detail in this section.
17The linearity of the non-monetary benefit of research could be relaxed, for example with
a function satisfying k′ (·) > 0, k′′ (·) < 0, and limx→∞ k′ (x) < 1+λ to ensure boundedness
in the optimal amount of research. This would make expressions in the first order conditions
for A and B in problem (18) slightly more complex, but, as will be apparent, no substantial
change would occur.
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3 Results
Preliminaries
To present the results, it is convenient to define the amount of applied research
which equates the marginal cost of applied and basic research.
Definition 1 a0 (θ;B) is the value of a which solves
ca (a, θ, B) = 1. (7)
Also let θ0 (B) be the value of θ which solves
ca (0, θ, B) = 1. (8)
That is, a0 (θ;B) is the amount of applied research which maximises a type
θ institution’s objective function when the aggregate amount of basic research
is B, and θ0 (B) is the type of the least efficient institution which is willing to
carry out applied research. Note that Assumptions 2.2.(iv) and 2.4 ensure that
θ0 (B) < θ¯. a0 (θ;B) can be defined as the individually efficient expenditure
on applied research. This is because an institution spends an additional unit
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of funding on the less costly research type and this is applied research, up
to level a0 (θ;B). Beyond that level, any additional funding is entirely spent
on basic research, the marginal cost of which is lower. Note that a0 (θ;B) is
independent of reputation: a low reputation institution, which has succeeded
in acquiring the capacity and the personnel to carry out high quality research,
has the same technology at its disposal as a better reputation institution.
Total differentiation of (7) gives ∂a
0(·)
∂θ
= − caθ(·)
caa(·) < 0, efficient institu-
tions have a higher individually efficient expenditure on applied research.
In addition, an increase in the total level of basic research in society in-
creases the individually efficient expenditure on applied research for all in-
stitutions, ∂a
0(·)
∂B
= − caB(·)
caa(·) > 0; and new institutions are induced to enter,
dθ0(B)
dB
= − caB(·)
caθ(·) > 0. This “crowding in” of basic research (Malla and Gray
2005) is natural.
Given (1), (2) can be replaced by:
B =
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θ¯
θ
[ri (θ)− ai (θ)] fi (θ) dθ. (9)
The government policy with perfect information
The first proposition gives the benchmark case in which the government has
perfect information. Let a∗ (θ;B∗), θ∗, A∗, and B∗ be defined by:
ca (a
∗ (θ;B∗) , θ, B∗) =
Y ′ (A∗) + k
1 + λ
, (10a)
ca (0, θ
∗, B∗) =
Y ′ (A∗) + k
1 + λ
, (10b)
A∗ =
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θ∗
θ
a∗ (θ;B∗) fi (θ) dθ, (10c)
k
1 + λ
=
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θ∗
θ
cB (a
∗ (θ;B∗) , θ, B∗) fi (θ) dθ + 1. (10d)
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By Assumption 3, Y
′(A∗)+k
1+λ
> 1, and so a∗ (θ;B∗) > a0 (θ;B∗) and θ∗ > θ0 (B).
Proposition 1 If the government could observe perfectly the efficiency pa-
rameter of each institution, it would ask institutions of type θ ∈ [θ, θ∗] and
reputation i to carry out a∗ (θ;B∗) applied research. It would ask institutions
to carry out an aggregate amount of basic research given by B∗.
The proofs of all the results are relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1 is a straightforward first best result: with perfect informa-
tion, the government simply asks each institution to carry out the socially
optimal amount of applied research: this is the level such that the marginal
cost of applied research equals the social marginal benefit, and is the same
in every institution. Institutions with type θ > θ∗ are unable to carry out
applied research at a cost lower than this value, and so they do not do any.
This is efficient; if it were not the case, the government could transfer re-
search from one institution to another and reduce the overall cost of applied
research. Because Y
′(A∗)+k
1+λ
> 1, the amount a∗ (θ;B∗) imposed by the govern-
ment exceeds a0 (θ;B∗), that is, it exceeds what each institution would choose
if it were simply given a budget to spend as it pleases, and in particular, the
marginal cost of applied research, which is equal across institutions, exceeds
the marginal cost of basic research. This is because the government derives
a larger benefit from applied research than individual institutions do. By the
same token, θ∗ > θ0 (B): some institutions which would not carry out applied
research with fixed funding, are instead instructed by the government to carry
out some.
The distribution of the aggregate amount of basic research across institu-
tions is made in such a way that all institutions have the same marginal cost
of basic research; this is trivially so in this set-up, where the marginal cost
of basic research is assumed constant, but would also hold in a more general
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model. As we see in Proposition 3, this is not the criterion that allocates
basic research under asymmetric information, when instead basic research is
used as a recompense to institutions that do more applied research. Note also
that more efficient institutions do more applied research: ∂a
∗(·)
∂θ
= − caθ(·)
caa(·) < 0.
They are better at it, so this is natural. Both an increase in k and a reduction
in λ increase a∗ (θ;B∗) for every θ ∈ [θ, θ¯], thus increasing A∗ and B∗.
Reputation conveys no useful information, and so it is ignored: institutions
with the same θ are treated identically, irrespective of their reputation. As I
show below, this is no longer the case with imperfect information.
Information asymmetry
The assumption of symmetric information is implausible and out of kilter with
the modern approach to government intervention in the economy. In what
follows I therefore assume that the government cannot observe an institution’s
efficiency parameter θ, and so it knows only the probability distribution from
which a given institution’s θ is drawn.
The government commits to menus of contracts, which, reputation being
observable, can depend on it. Subsequently, each research institution can ap-
ply for funds and choose any of the contracts available to institutions in its
reputation group. A menu of contracts can be expressed as a non-linear price
Ti (a), where Ti is the total payment to an institution with reputation i that
carries out amount a of applied research. I assume therefore that applied
research is contractible. It does not matter whether or not basic research is
contractible: this, as I discuss in the next subsection, is due to the direction
of the misalignment of the government’s and the institutions’ incentives. The
government funding policy is thus simply the vector of functions {Ti (a)}Ni=1.
The least efficient institution in each reputation group that applies for fund-
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ing, denoted by θˆi ∈
[
θ, θ¯
]
, can itself be treated as a choice variable for the
government. If Ti (a) is increasing, it determines immediately the amount
of basic research carried out as bi (θ) = Ti (ai (θ)) − c (ai (θ) , θ, B). Because
bi (θ) = ri (θ)−ai (θ), a contract can equivalently be written as a direct mech-
anism
(
ri (θ) , ai (θ)
)
, and thus a policy is a vector of pairs of functions, which
establish the amount of total research and applied research in an institution
of type θ and reputation i:
{
{ri (θ) , ai (θ)}θ∈[θ,θˆi]
}N
i=1
. (11)
Contracts thus determine payments which depend on the amount of ap-
plied research carried out. If institutions are risk neutral, with many projects
starting, the amount of applied research carried out, a, can be inferred from
the number of research projects completed successfully in the period, which,
plausibly, is observable.
Contracting basic research
One may think that contracts could also be made conditional on basic re-
search, for example by specifying the number and quality of basic research
publications. This would in theory compel institutions to reveal indirectly
their type, and thus potentially allow direct implementation of the first best
derived in Proposition 1. This policy, however, would be perverse and unlikely
to be enforceable. The reason is that, as Proposition 1 shows, at the first best
institutions are asked to carry out a combination of applied and basic research
such that the marginal cost of applied research is higher than the marginal
cost of basic research. Given this, if the government simply asked institutions
to report their own θ, and offered them the corresponding funding, then a
type θ institution, which is offered funding Ti (a
∗ (θ;B∗)) and asked to carry
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out a∗ (θ;B∗) applied research, would have an incentive to claim to have a
higher θ than it has. If it did so, it would receive less funding, but neverthe-
less be able to increase the total amount of research it does with this lower
funding, as it would be able to switch away from the more costly applied re-
search and do more of the less expensive basic research. Formally, presented
with a funding level menu Ti (a
∗ (θ;B∗)), a type θ institution would claim to
be of type max
{
a∗−1 (a0 (θ;B∗)) , θˆi
}
. If it did so, its marginal cost of doing
applied research would be as near as possible to 1, its marginal cost of basic
research. Thus, implementing the first best with a contract that conditions
payments on the amount of basic research carried out would perversely re-
quire that institutions be punished if they have “too many” prestigious basic
research publications.
To see this in an example, suppose that the applied research cost function
is the one given in footnote 13: a(a+1)θθ¯B
1+B (θ¯−θ)
, with θ¯ = 1 and B = 100, and that
the optimal policy is such that the government asks an institution with θ = 1
10
to carry out 8 units of applied research and 2 units of basic research, for a
total funding of $10.08. This institution’s payoff is 10, and its marginal cost
of applied research is 1.9078, higher than its marginal cost of basic research.
Suppose that the optimal policy asks slightly less efficient institutions, those
with θ = 11
100
, to do 7.9 unit of applied research and 1.3 units of basic research,
for a funding of $10.077. The efficient (θ = 1
10
) institution’s cost of carrying out
7.9 units of applied research is $7.8903: therefore it has an incentive to report
θ = 11
100
, receive lower funding of $10.077 instead of $10.08, carry out 7.9 units
of applied research, and use the residual $2.1866 for basic research, improving
its payoff from 10 to 10.087. A fine of $0.1 for the 0.8866 “excess” units of
basic research, were it imposed, would reduce the payoff to 9.9866 and thus
eliminate the incentive to report a type θ = 11
100
, but would be hard to justify in
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practice.18 It would also be hard to enforce, as, quite apart from any possible
difficulty to attribute precisely each publication to applied or basic research,
an institution risking a penalty for having too many publications in basic
research could always plausibly claim to have been “lucky”, its expenditure
on basic research churning out an unexpectedly high number of publications,
or perhaps seek ways to elude penalties by “hiding” basic research in some
way, such as delaying its publication.
To sum up, the government conditions the funding it gives an institution
only on the amount of applied research this institution carries out. In case
of dispute, an external adjudicator can verify whether the stipulated level
of applied research a has been carried out, and hence confirm whether the
conditions have been met for the agreed amount of funding to be paid out. The
asymmetry between basic and applied research created by the fact that the
government would like to induce institutions to do more of the latter than they
would choose implies that contracts conditioning payments on basic research
would be hard to enforce, because, beyond a certain level, they would dictate
lower payments for increased success in basic research. Note that peer review
based formal evaluation mechanisms, which are intended to assess the research
effort of institutions, do distinguish between applied and basic research. For
example, the version of the exercise carried out in 2014 in the UK, known
as REF, has two measures of output, academic publications, judged solely on
their academic merit, irrespective of their applied or basic nature, and impact
of research on society: this needs to quantify “all kinds of social, economic and
cultural benefits and impacts beyond academia” (HEFCE 2011), and, given
both the short time in which impact must have measurable effects and the
exacting standard of the required link from research to benefits, it applies in
18Lazear (1997) also points out the difficulty of providing explicit incentives for basic
research.
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practice only to applied research.
Incentive compatibility
In this subsection, I determine the constraints imposed by the information
disadvantage of the government. I describe them via the standard revela-
tion approach, that is supposing that the government asks each institution
to report its own type, having committed to a policy as a function of the
reported type. By the revelation principle, the government cannot improve
on the payoff it can obtain by restricting its choices to policies that satisfy the
incentive compatibility constraint. This is the property that no institution
has an incentive to misreport its type.
Before deriving this constraint, I introduce an assumption which ensures
that asymmetry of information is sufficiently important.
Assumption 4 (i) cθ (·) > caθ(·)caa(·)
(
1 + d
dθ
(
Fi(θ)
fi(θ)
))
, i = 1, . . . , N ; (ii) cθ (·) >
caθθ(·)
caaθ(·) , (iii) caaθ (·) > 0, caθθ (·) > 0.
Loosely speaking, (i) and (ii) require cθ (·) to be “large”. Thus the first
two statements in Assumption 4 require that an institution’s cost of carrying
out applied research varies enough with θ, making what is unobservable to
government sufficiently important. This makes sense as it is this information
disadvantage that renders the analysis relevant: if all research institutions
had similar efficiency, the government’s inability to observe their productivity
would be obviously irrelevant. Of course, the considerable effort that funding
agencies exert to ascertain the research potential of the research institutions
they support financially does suggest strongly that these differences are indeed
important in practice. The third statement in Assumption 4 is a regularity
restriction.19
19As in the Laffont and Tirole (1993) contribution whose methodology is borrowed here,
24
Proposition 2 A feasible and incentive compatible policy (11) satisfies, for
θ ∈
[
θ, θˆi
]
, i = 1, . . . , N :
r˙i (θ) = −cθ (ai (θ) , θ, B) , ri (θ) free; ri
(
θˆi
)
= a0
(
θˆi, B
)
, (12a)
a˙i (θ) 6 0, (12b)
ai (θ)− a0 (θ;B) > 0, (12c)
ri (θ)− ai (θ) > 0. (12d)
Here, as in some of the mechanism design literature, a dot over a variable
denotes its derivative with respect to the unobserved parameter, θ in this case.
The derivation of this result, given in more detail in the Appendix, is
standard. Faced with a contract Ti (a), if a type θ institution carries out
amount a of applied research, it can carry out an amount Ti (a) − c (a, θ, B)
of basic research, and so its payoff is
r = a+ Ti (a)− c (a, θ, B) . (13)
The first order condition for maximisation of (13) by choice of a is given by
1− T ′ (a)− ca (a, θ, B) = 0. (14)
Because this institution’s informational rent as a function of its type can be
written as
r (θ) = max
a
{a+ T (a)− c (a, θ, B)} ,
the link between an institution’s type and its informational rent is determined
the restriction on the third derivative of the payoff function ensures the sufficiency of the
first order conditions in the government second best problem and so it rules out stochastic
mechanisms, but does not have a straightforward interpretation.
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as
r˙ (θ) = (1− T ′ (a (θ))− ca (a (θ) , θ, B)) a˙ (θ)− cθ (a (θ) , θ, B) . (15)
In (15), the first term is 0 by the envelope theorem, (14), and this gives the
differential equation in (12a). Condition (12b) is standard, (12c) follows from
the requirement that total funding be decreasing in θ: if not, an institution
could pretend to be of a worse type than it really is, receive more funding and
also be required to do less applied research. (12d) is simply bi (θ) > 0.
Although the formal model is static, it is worth noting that the “ratchet
effect” (Freixas et al 1985) would not be a problem in a fuller dynamic model
based on the present analysis. According to this effect, current incentives are
affected by the cost of reducing future informational rent, which occurs when
revealing one’s type provides information to the principal on the likelihood
of future types. This does not apply here, because there is no intertemporal
information trade-off, as current research enhances future reputation, and if,
as Proposition 4 shows to be the case, institutions that are revealed to be
of a better type today enjoy more informational rent in the future. Thus
institutions would not want to alter their static preferred allocation of funds
to basic and applied research in order to obtain future benefits.
One final assumption is needed before presenting the government max-
imisation problem. Define B¯ as the value of B which solves the following
equation:
B =
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θ∗
θ
∫ θ∗
θ
(cθ (a
∗ (x;B) , x, B) dx− a∗ (θ;B)) fi (θ) dθ. (16)
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Assumption 5
k
1 + λ
−
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θ∗
θ
cB
(
a∗
(
θ; B¯
)
, θ, B¯
)
fi (θ) dθ < 0. (17)
In words, as is shown below in the proof of Proposition 3, B¯ is the value
of aggregate research needed to provide every institution with incentives for
self-selection, when all institutions are asked to carry out the first best level
of applied research, derived in (10d) by Proposition 1. The LHS in (17) is the
marginal social benefit of basic research, given by the sum of the direct benefit
and the aggregate marginal reduction in the cost of applied research. Thus
Assumption 5 states that when basic research is set to satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint for each institution, then the social marginal benefit
of research is negative. This imposes a limit on the amount of basic research
that the government is willing to fund: you can have too much basic research.
If Assumption 5 did not hold, asymmetry of information would not prevent
the government from obtaining the first best: this corresponds to the extreme
case of zero cost of public funding.
The optimal funding policy
The government maximisation problem is the choice of a policy (11) which sat-
isfies the constraints derived in Proposition 2 and maximises the government’s
objective function. As before, the aggregate amount of applied and basic re-
search, A and B, are best treated as parameters of the problem, subject to
their respective definition constraints, (4) and (9).
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The government’s problem is therefore the following.
max{
θˆi,{ri(θ),ai(θ)}θ∈[θ,θˆi]
}N
i=1
,
A,B
{
Y (A) + k (A+B)−
(1 + λ)
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θˆi
θ
[c (ai (θ) , θ, B) + ri (θ)− ai (θ)] fi (θ) dθ
}
,
s.t.: (4), (9), (12a), (12b), (12c), (12d). (18)
Because institutions fund all their research from public sources, they all
have zero reservation utility, and the participation constraint is implied by
(12c): I have therefore omitted it.20 The optimal funding policy is derived
next.
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 2-5 hold. If problem (18) has a solution
ai (θ), bi (θ), then there exist θ˜i, θ
K
i , θˆ ∈
(
θ, θ
)
with θ < θKi 6 θ˜i 6 θˆ < θ0 (B),
for i = 1, . . . , N , such that:
if θ ∈ [θ, θKi ) then ai (θ) > a0 (θ;B) and bi (θ) > 0;
if θ ∈
[
θKi , θ˜i
)
then ai (θ) = a
0 (θ;B) and bi (θ) > 0;
if θ ∈
[
θ˜i, θˆ
)
then ai (θ) > a
0 (θ;B) and bi (θ) = 0;
if θ = θˆ then ai (θ) = a
0 (θ;B) and bi (θ) = 0;
if θ ∈
(
θˆ, θ
]
then ai (θ) = bi (θ) = 0.
Note that θˆ, the cut-off value of θ, is the same for all reputation groups.
The best way to illustrate and discuss Proposition 3 is through the graphical
20If institutions were able to fund research independently, then the participation con-
straint would have to be considered explicitly, with the possible complication that the
reservation utility itself would in general depend on θ. However, if institutions’ own funds
are non-increasing in θ, as is plausible, then the potential non-monotonicity studied by
Jullien (2000) would not occur.
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analysis in Figures 2 and 3, which plots the amount of research on the vertical
axis as a function of an institution’s efficiency parameter θ, and, in Figure 3,
also of its reputation i. To this end, it is useful to restate the optimal policy
described in Proposition 3 as Corollary 1, which is cast in terms of the function
aKi (θ;B, β), defined as follows. For given B > 0 and β > 0, let aKi (θ;B, β)
be the solution in a of
ca (a, θ, B) =
Y ′ (A) + k
1 + λ
+ β − βFi (θ)
fi (θ)
cθa (a, θ, B) . (19)
At the optimal policy, the parameter β is 1 minus the Lagrange multiplier
of constraint (9); in economics terms, β measures the marginal net benefit of
total basic research. At the first best, the government pushes the total amount
of basic research to the level where its marginal benefit equals its marginal
cost, and so β = 0, the last two terms in (19) are also 0, and the curve
aKi (θ;B, β) coincides with a
∗ (θ;B), defined in (10a), the first best amount of
applied research by a type θ institution. In the second best, if Assumptions
2 and 4 hold, there is a trade-off between research and distortionary costs
of taxation, and β > 0, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3. Relatively
to the position determined by (10a), curve (19) is rotated clockwise around
a point with abscissa to the right of θ: its value at θ = θ increases, and,
given Assumption 4, the slope increases in absolute value: this is the standard
distortion due to asymmetric information (Laffont and Tirole 1993).
Corollary 1 Let Assumptions 2-5 hold. Define
aˆi (θ;B, β) = max
{
a0 (θ;B) , aKi (θ;B, β)
}
, (20)
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Figure 2: Applied and basic research. The second best policy.
and ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
as the solution to the following differential equation:
x˙ (θ) = −cθ (x (θ) , θ, B) , x
(
θˆ
)
= a0
(
θˆ;B
)
. (21)
If problem (18) has a solution, then there exist B > 0, θˆ ∈ [θ, θ¯], and β > 0,
such that:
ai (θ) = min
{
aˆi (θ;B, β) , a
r
(
θ;B, θˆ
)}
, (22)
bi (θ) = max
{
ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
− aˆi (θ;B, β) , 0
}
, (23)
for θ ∈
[
θ, θˆ
]
, and ai (θ) = bi (θ) = 0 for θ ∈
(
θˆ, θ¯
]
, i = 1, . . . , N .
To illustrate the optimal policy, take Figure 2 first, which considers the
institutions with a given reputation i. In each panel, the solid thin red line
is the locus ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
, defined in (21); the dotted line is the locus a0 (θ;B),
given in (7), and the dashed line is aKi (θ;B, β), defined in (19).
From Corollary 1, we can plot an institution’s applied research as θ varies as
the higher of the two curves a0 (θ;B) and aKi (θ;B, β), if it is below a
r
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
,
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and otherwise as ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
itself. This is the solid thick red curve; only
institutions with θ below θˆ, which is, by construction, the intersection of
ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
and a0 (θ;B), apply for government funding. All three curves are
strictly decreasing, and so a˙ (θ) < 0. As explained above, aKi (·), is above
a∗ (θ;B) (not drawn, to avoid cluttering the diagram), determined in (10a),
and therefore also above a0 (θ;B) in a right neighbourhood of θ: the most
efficient institutions do more applied research than at the first best. The re-
search carried out by a type θ reputation i institution is obtained from the
incentive compatibility constraint, (12a):
ri (θ) =
∫ θˆ
θ
cθ (ai (x) , x, B) dx+ a
0
(
θˆ;B
)
, i = 1, . . . , N .
In the case drawn in the LHS panel, this is the higher thin red line in the
diagram. Basic research therefore is the vertical distance between the two
red curves, shaded in grey in the diagrams.21 It is ai (θ) 6 ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
: thus
ri (θ) 6 ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
, with strict inequality for θ ∈
[
θ, θ˜i
)
, and, as drawn, the
thick red line is below the thin black line to the left of θ˜i.
The panels of Figure 2 differ in the position of the curve aKi (·). This can
have three kinds of relationship with the two other relevant curves, indicated
by the white numbers in a black disk, reflecting the three possible patterns
of complementary slackness of the constraints in Problem (18). In region 1,
both (12c) and (12d) are slack; in region 2, constraint (12c) is binding. In
region 3, (12d) is binding. The conceptual difference between regions 1 and 2
is that research institutions in region 2 choose their “preferred” combination
of applied and basic research, and those in region 1 are induced by the policy
to do more than this amount. Institutions in region 3 do only applied research.
21If institutions varied also in their ability to carry out basic research, the analysis would
be slightly modified to capture the trade-off between using basic research funding to provide
incentives for applied research and allocating it to the more efficient institutions.
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Because β > 0 at the second best policy, the marginal net benefit of
aggregate basic research is higher than at the first best, and therefore the
optimal value of B is lower: asymmetric information reduces the amount
of basic research. This makes applied research more expensive, and hence
reduces it, and, given that more efficient institutions do more applied research,
some high θ institutions do less applied research than at the first best. Note
also that, applied research being allocated less efficiently, its overall cost is
not necessarily lower than at the first best even though its overall amount is
smaller. Also note θˆ < θ0 (B), and therefore θˆ < θ∗. Thus fewer institutions
receive funding than at the first best: the funding agency achieves this by
offering contracts that require institutions to carry out at least a threshold
amount of applied research in order to qualify for any public funding.
Figure 2 can be used to carry out some simple comparative statics anal-
ysis. To this end, note that the position of the curve aKi (θ;B, β), defined
in (19), is affected by four factors: the direct effect of applied research on
national income, Y ′ (A); the direct effect of research on the policy maker’s
payoff, k; the shadow cost of public funds λ; and finally, β, the endogenously
determined net marginal benefit effect of basic research, its marginal reduc-
tion of institutions’ cost of doing applied research, net of the cost of the raise
in tax necessary to pay for it. The first three simply shift the dashed curve
aKi (θ;B, β) up and down in a parallel fashion. Thus, other things equal, in-
creases in k and in Y ′ (A) and decreases in λ all increase the amount of applied
research, and decrease the amount of basic research carried out by a type θ
institution. Of course, changes in these parameters also affect β, the net ben-
efit of basic research, so the above discussion is only a first approximation.
The effect of changes in these parameters on the amount of basic research is
in general ambiguous: when applied research becomes more valuable, there
is a substitution effect, basic research becomes relatively less valuable and so
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Figure 3: Institutions with different reputation.
less of it is carried out, and an “income” effect: as more applied research is
done, the importance is increased of reducing its cost by increasing B.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is further illustrated when comparing in-
stitutions of different reputation. Note that, in the second best, where β > 0,
the distribution Fi (θ) appears in the definition of a
K
i (θ;B, β) and therefore a
type θ institution’s amount of applied research does depend on its reputation.
The next Proposition determines the direction of this dependence.
Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 1-5 hold. Let h > `. Then aKh (θ;B, β) >
aK` (θ;B, β), for all θ ∈
(
θ, θK`
)
. Consequently ah (θ) > a` (θ), and rh (θ) >
r` (θ) in a right neighbourhood of θ.
To examine graphically how reputation affects research at the optimum,
note that, in Figure 2, the following are independent of reputation i: the
“starting point” of the dashed curve aKi (θ;B, β), the dotted curve a
0 (θ, B),
and the type of the least efficient active institutions, θˆ. The rest of the diagram
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does vary with i. Thus, for example, if an institution has better reputation
than another, then its curve aKh (θ;B, β) is pivoted anticlockwise around its
value at θ = θ, and hence point θKh on the LHS panel and point θ˜h on the RHS
panel, both shift to the left of the corresponding points θK` and θ˜`, as shown
by the gold curves in Figure 3, where θKh < θ
K
` in the LHS panel, and θ˜h < θ˜`
on the RHS panel. As Proposition 4 states, a higher reputation institution
does more applied research than an institution with the same θ and a less
established reputation.
Figure 3 also shows rh (θ), the total research done by institutions with
higher reputation h. Relative to r` (θ), this is rotated clockwise, pivoting
around θK` in the LHS panel, and around θ˜` in the RHS panel: a higher
reputation institution does more total research. It is necessarily the case that
the most efficient institutions do more research and more basic research if they
have high reputation. This can be reversed for higher θ; for example, in the
RHS panel of Figure 3, institutions with efficiency parameter between θ˜h and
θ˜` do no basic research if they have high reputation, and a strictly positive
amount if they have low reputation.
To understand these results, consider first the intuition for the shape of the
functions ai (θ) and ri (θ) for institutions in a given reputation group. With
symmetric information, there is no incentive compatibility constraint, and so
the last term in (19) is absent: when this term is included, the dashed curve
in Figure 2 is rotated clockwise around the intersection with the vertical line
θ = θ. That is, the applied research schedule is steeper with asymmetric
information. The reason is the standard one: the government needs to induce
self-selection in an efficient institution, that is it needs to dissuade one which
is contemplating choosing the combination of funding and applied research
designed for an institution with slightly higher θ instead of that designed for
its own type. The extra funding that comes with the extra applied research
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plays this role: it does serve as an incentive for an efficient institution, without
at the same time tempting less efficient ones to pretend to be more efficient
than they really are, because, given their higher θ, the extra applied research
required to receive this extra funding would be too expensive for the latter.
Consider now the intuition for Proposition 4, according to which institu-
tions with better reputation do, at the optimum, more applied and more total
research, and so receive more funding, than equally efficient institutions with
lower reputation.
At the optimal policy, the aggregate amount of applied research A ex-
ceeds the total amount that would result if institutions could choose their
preferred level of applied research. Providing incentives for them to do more
has a cost in terms of informational rent, and, to minimise the ensuing ef-
ficiency loss, given that caθ (·) > 0, and so a∗ (θ;B∗) − a0 (θ;B) decreases
with θ, the more efficient institutions are “asked” for a greater increase over
the individually efficient level a0 (θ;B). When Assumption 1 holds, there
are more efficient institutions in higher reputation groups: to see this, take
θ2 > θ and consider a small interval (θ2 − ε, θ2 + ε). In expectation, there
are [Fi (θ2 + ε)− Fi (θ2 − ε)] qi ∼= 2εfi (θ2) qi institutions with reputation i in
this interval, and Fi (θ2) qi with θ below θ2. By Lemma A3 in the Appendix,
Fi(θ)
fi(θ)
increases with reputation, that is, there are proportionally more low θ
institutions in a higher reputation group. In other words, high reputation
institutions are more likely to have drawn a low θ and so be good at research.
This implies that to be more likely to push more low θ institutions closer to
their first best level of applied research, the government favours high reputa-
tion groups, where more low θ institutions are concentrated. It is of course
more costly to reward high efficiency institutions, because they are asked to
do more research, which is increasingly expensive as caa (·) > 0; but the gov-
ernment does not mind this in the least, because it pays them with basic
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research, which it values itself, and so the cost incurred by the government
is the cost of withdrawing basic research from less efficient institutions, more
likely to be found in lower reputation groups. In the standard Laffont-Tirole
procurement model, awarding an extra $1 of information rent has a cost ex-
ceeding $1 because of the shadow cost of public funding; here, for fixed B, the
information rent is paid by lower reputation institutions, which do less basic
research, and so it has a cost of exactly $1.
In looser words, asymmetric information makes applied research more ex-
pensive, and the government prefers to ration it by allocating it to the insti-
tutions which are better at it, the low θ ones, and, in expectations, there are
more such institutions among those with high reputation, and so the govern-
ment biases funding towards high reputation institutions.
4 Implementation
This section investigates how a central funding agency can implement in prac-
tice the optimal policy described in Proposition 3 and Corollary 1. Recall that
this agency offers all institutions contracts that stipulate a link between the
amount of applied research carried out and the total amount of funding an
institution of reputation i receives, that is a vector of functions {Ti (a)}Ni=1.
Because at the optimal policy there is a one-to-one relationship between θ and
a, this is well defined.
To determine the shape of these functions, consider an institution of type
θ and reputation i which, given the incentive compatible policy (11), chooses
ri (θ) and ai (θ), and therefore receives total funding Ti (ai (θ)). If the amount
of applied research identified in Proposition 1 is in region 1 in Figure 2, this
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total funding is
T (ai (θ)) = c
(
aKi (θ;B, β) , θ, B
)
+
[
ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
− aKi (θ;B, β)
]
.
The first term is the cost of carrying out aKi (θ;B, β) applied research, and
the sum in the square brackets the cost (and the amount) of basic research.
For fixed B and β, let θKi (a;B, β) be the inverse of the function a
K
i (θ;B, β):
that is, θKi (a;B, β) is the value of θ such that a
K
i (θ;B, β) = a. Consider an i-
reputation institution which, faced with a schedule Ti (a), needs to choose the
amount a of applied research to carry out; if the policy is incentive compatible,
it has type θKi (a;B, β), and the total funding it receives is given by:
Ti (a) = c
(
a, θKi (a;B, β) , B
)
+ ar
(
θKi (a;B, β) ;B, θˆ
)
− a. (24)
Faced with (24), a reputation i type θ institution does indeed want to carry
out precisely the amount a = aKi (θ;B, β) of applied research. To see this,
note that, given (24), a type θ institution’s optimisation problem is:
max
a>0
{a+ [Ti (a)− c (a, θ, B)]} , (25)
where Ti (a) is given by (24). The first order condition for (25) is
ca
(
a, θKi (a;B, β) , B
)
= ca (a, θ, B) ,
which gives a = aKi (θ;B, β) as required (provided it is at least a
0 (θ;B),
otherwise the institution does not apply for public funding). The following
determines the shape of (24).
Corollary 2 If ai (θ) = a
K
i (θ;B, β), then Ti (a) is increasing and convex in
a.
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The same procedure gives the shape of Ti (a) in the other regions. Begin
with region 2. Here, let θ0 (a;B) be the inverse function of a0 (θ;B), so that
total funding is given by:
Ti (a) = c
(
a, θ0 (a;B) , B
)
+ ar
(
θ0 (a,B) ;B, θˆ
)
− a. (26)
Corollary 3 If ai (θ) = a
0 (θ;B), then Ti (a) is constant in a.
So in this region all institutions receive the same funding, irrespective of
their efficiency and of their reputation. Finally region 3.
Corollary 4 If ai (θ) = a
r
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
, then Ti (a) is increasing and convex in
a.
Moreover, at the boundary between regions 1 and 3 the slope of Ti (a) is
increasing in a. Having determined the shape of the function Ti (a), I show
next, by means of a graphical analysis, how the funding agency can implement
it in practice.
A graphical analysis
Consider Figure 4. The axis pointing west measures θ, the south and east
axes measure a, and the north axis measures total funding T (a). I reproduce
the RHS panel of Figure 3 in the diagram in the southwest quadrant, with the
axes pointing in the opposite directions. The northwest diagram measures the
cost of applied research, as a function of θ for a given value of a: this curve
is drawn for three different values of a, namely a0
(
θˆ, B
)
, aK`
(
θK` ;B, β
)
, and
aKh
(
θK` ;B, β
)
. Note the subscripts in the latter two: these are the applied
research by a type θK` institution with low and high reputation, respectively.
Because aK` (·) > aKh (·), the corresponding curve is higher. Because caθ (·) > 0,
the curves fan out from the origin (and because caaθ (·) > 0, they are convex).
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Figure 4: Building the funding menu from the optimal policy.
From the diagrams in the southwest and northwest quadrants, the north-
east quadrant constructs, via the 45◦ line in the southeast quadrant, the fund-
ing schedules that implement the second best optimal policy. To see how,
consider first the worst institution that receives funding. Its efficiency param-
eter is θˆ, and it needs to do a0
(
θˆ, B
)
applied research. The funding it receives,
T
(
a0
(
θˆ, B
))
, just pays for this research. This amount is measured on the
north axis. From the lower curve, it can be seen that the funding needed by
institution θˆ to do a0
(
θˆ, B
)
units of applied research is the ordinate of the
lower curve on the north axis, c
(
a0
(
θˆ, B
)
; θ, B
)
. An institution with slightly
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lower θ, say θˆ− ε, does, at the optimum, a0
(
θˆ − ε, B
)
applied research, and,
by Corollary 3, receives the same amount of funding as a type θˆ institution:
therefore, the ordinate Ti
(
a0
(
θˆ − ε, B
))
is the same as Ti
(
a0
(
θˆ, B
))
, and
so the function Ti in the northeast quadrant is flat between θˆ− ε and θˆ, even
though a
(
θˆ − ε
)
-type institution does more applied research with the same
funding. This is true down to efficiency parameter θKh : all institutions with
θ higher than θKh will choose a point in the interval
[
θˆ, θKh
]
, with funding
T
(
a0
(
θˆ, B
))
independent of their type and their reputation.
Consider now an institution with θ = θK` (or just below). If it has rep-
utation `, it needs to do aK`
(
θK` ;B, β
)
applied research, which has a cost
c
(
aK`
(
θK` ;B, β
)
; θ, B
)
, the ordinate of point Y` on the north axis. The funding
it receives is instead T
(
a0
(
θˆ
)
;B
)
, which is higher. The difference between
funding and cost of applied research is the vertical distance between points
X` and Y`. This is the same in the northwest and in the southwest quadrant
(a unit of basic research costs a unit of funding), and this amount is devoted
by this institutions to basic research. An institution of the same efficiency θK`
and higher reputation h does more applied research, so the relevant curve in
the northwest is the higher solid gold line. Again the ordinate of point Xh is
the total funding received by this institution, and again the distance between
points Xh and Yh is the same in the southwest and in the northwest diagram.
Transporting the amount of funding to the northeast quadrant, the gold line is
the funding that an h-reputation institution receives when it chooses to carry
out the amount aKh
(
θK` ;B, β
)
of applied research. And so on for other values
of θ.
In sum, the government funding agency commits to a set of funding sched-
ules, each available to institutions of a given reputation level, as depicted in
the northeast quadrant of Figure 4, and institutions choose the amount of
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Figure 5: Implementation: The LHS of Figure 2.
applied research they do, and receive the corresponding level of funding, mea-
sured on the vertical axis, as the ordinate of the schedule corresponding to
their reputation group.
Research and efficiency
Figure 5 shows in more detail how three institutions, with the same repu-
tation ` and different efficiency, choose their preferred combination of ap-
plied research and funding when faced with the schedule T` (a), derived in the
northeast quadrant of Figure 4. In each panel, the function T` (a), defined for
a ∈
[
a0
(
θˆ;B
)
, aK` (θ;B, β)
]
is the thick red solid line; because the funding
agency cannot tell types apart, it is the same in the three panels. Points on this
locus represent combinations of funding and applied research which the fund-
ing agency allows research institutions with reputation ` to choose from (it is
again drawn for the case depicted in the LHS panel of Figures 2 and 3). Each
diagram shows, shaded, the “feasible set”, the combinations of funding and
the amount of applied research which a type θ institution is able to carry out
with that funding. It also shows, as the solid thin lines, the indifference curves:
these are the combinations of funding and applied research which allow the
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institutions to carry out a constant amount of research, basic plus applied.22
The LHS, the middle and the RHS panel show these for the least efficient active
institution, for a slightly more efficient one, and for a very efficient institution,
respectively. Consider first a type θˆ institution, shown on the LHS panel. Its
feasible set, the grey shaded area, is the set
{
(a, T ) ∈ R2+|c
(
a, θˆ, B
)
6 T
}
;
its shape follows from caa (·) > 0 postulated in Assumption 2.2.(i). This insti-
tution has effectively no choice: only the point
(
a0
(
θˆ;B
)
, T`
(
a0
(
θˆ;B
)))
,
marked by X in the LHS diagram, is both on the solid thick locus and in its
“feasible set”. Not so however for more efficient research institutions: take
type θ1 ∈
(
θK` , θˆ
)
, illustrated in the middle panel. Its feasible set is obviously
bigger than a type θˆ’s. It therefore has a genuine choice among the points
which are both in the grey area and on the thick solid red line. The best
among such points is (a0 (θ1;B) , T` (a
0 (θ1;B))), point X in the diagram, the
point of tangency between the highest indifference curve and the thick solid
line. Notice that the required level of applied research, a0 (θ1;B), will cost
this institution only c
(
a0
(
θˆ;B
)
, θˆ, B
)
, the vertical height of point Y , which
is less than T` (a
0 (θ1;B)) (which is equal to T` (a
0 (θ1;B))). After it has paid
for its applied research, it will spend its “leftover” funding on basic research,
which has marginal cost of 1, rather than on more applied research, which,
if pushed above a0 (θ1;B), would have a marginal cost exceeding 1. A type
θ1 institution, therefore, carries out an amount of basic research measured by
the vertical distance between points Y and X in the middle panel of Figure
5.
Finally consider a very efficient institution, one with θ2 < θ
K
` . Its efficient
level of applied research is a0 (θ2;B), the abscissa of the minima of the indif-
ference curves in the RHS panel of Figure 5. This is the level it would choose
22Because of the separability in the cost function, the indifference curves all reach a
minimum at a = a0 (θ;B), as can be seen by totally differentiating a+ t− c (a, θ,B).
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if funding were constant. But the optimal policy is designed so that this in-
stitution does more than this amount: faced with the solid thick schedule, a
type θ2 research institution chooses the combination that allows it to be on
the highest possible indifference curve, namely tangency point X` in the RHS
panel of the diagram in Figure 5.23 I explain in Section 5 below how research
grant funding induces institutions to choose this point. This institution’s cost
of carrying out the amount of applied research aK` (θ2;B, β) is the ordinate
of point X`, and so a type θ2 institution spends the rest, measured by the
distance between X` and Y`, on basic research. I have also drawn the gold
curve, which shows how an equally efficient institution with a better reputa-
tion would be offered a schedule such that it would choose a higher level of
applied research, Xh, and spend the amount measured by the vertical distance
between Yh and Xh on basic research.
When the relative position of the curves a0
(
θˆ;B
)
and aK` (θ;B, β) is in-
stead as shown in the RHS panel of Figure 2, the optimal funding can be
implemented by the schedule illustrated in Figure 6. This differs from Figure
5 only in that the initial part of the schedule is also increasing. The RHS and
23When the curve Ci (a) is convex, as in Figure 5, then the tangency point is a local, and
hence a global, maximum; this is shown in Lemma A4. If the curve Ci (a) were concave,
then the tangency point would clearly be a maximum.
43
 
i
~K
i

Figure \ref{Fig:2} print as figure4.pdf
  ,;BaKi
 ir
  ,;BaKi
 ir
 ˆ
~
iˆ
 Ba ;0 
 Ba ;0 
 B0 



 B0
Figure 7: Applied and basic research. Low social value of applied research.
the LHS panels are conceptually identical in Figures 5 and 6: a type θˆ insti-
tution has no choice (LHS) and efficient institutions do more applied research
than they would like (RHS), and have enough funding to do basic research.
In the middle panel, in contrast, an institution of an intermediate θ is seen
to spend all of its budget on applied research, to do more than its efficient
level of applied research, and to have no funding left for basic research: in
the picture, the solid thick curve is steeper that the indifference curve at the
boundary of the feasible set.
5 Remarks
Low social value of applied research
I end the article with three observations. The first sketches how the analysis
changes when the second inequality in Assumption 3 is violated, that is when
the social value of applied research is low. The curve aKi (·) is below a0 (·) at
θ = θ. This is illustrated in Figure 7. If a solution exists, the most productive
research institutions carry out their preferred level of applied research. How-
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ever, if there are institutions which are given an incentive to do more than
this, as in the left hand side panel, they are the middle θ institutions: regions 1
and 2 in Figure 5 are “swapped”. If the relationship between applied research
and efficiency is reversed in this case, the relationship between reputation and
applied research is not. Given that the schedule aKi (·) rotates anticlockwise
around its leftmost point when reputation becomes higher (compare the gold
and the red curve in Figure 3), the institutions whose applied research exceeds
the individually rational level a0 (θ;B) do more research if their reputation is
higher.
If the relative position of the various curves is as depicted in the RHS panel
of Figure 7, then the optimal policy is implemented simply with constant
funding: the rotation of the schedule aKi (·) due to the higher reputation has
no effect and all research institutions that agree to carry out at least a0
(
θˆ;B
)
applied research, receive the funds necessary to pay for it, which they can then
use in any way they choose. In this case the diagram of the funding schedule
looks exactly the same as the flat segment, the initial portion of the thick solid
line on Figure 5, from a0
(
θˆ;B
)
to ai
(
θKi
)
.
Recall that the relative position of the two curves depends on the so-
cial value of research, which, as discussed, might be lowered by international
spillovers. It seems plausible that the situation depicted in the RHS panel of
Figure 7 applies to a small country, which would be less able to internalise the
benefits of applied research. In this light, the discussion of this section would
therefore loosely suggest that smaller countries should be more likely to adopt
a constant funding scheme.
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“Dual support system”
In many countries, research is funded through a dual channel funding mech-
anism: some funding is a lump-sum, and some is allocated on a project by
project basis (for example, DBIS 2010). The optimal mechanism derived in
Section 4 can be implemented in a way that resembles this principle: all in-
stitutions, regardless of their reputation, can apply for lump sum funding
c
(
a0
(
θˆ;B
)
, θˆ, B
)
, (27)
provided they carry out at least the “qualifying” level of applied research
a0
(
θˆ;B
)
. In addition, institutions can apply to have specific projects funded
through a grant. However, these grants are not available to all institutions:
to qualify to apply, an institution needs to carry out at least a threshold level
a0
(
θKi ;B
)
of applied research with the fixed sum (27). This higher threshold
is set at a lower level for institutions with better reputation: this follows from
a0
(
θKh ;B
)
> a0
(
θK` ;B
)
. The additional grant funding is governed by the
formula
gi (a) = Ti
(
a+ a0
(
θKi ;B
))− c(a0 (θˆ;B) , θˆ, B) , (28)
where gi (a) is the amount of grant awarded for agreeing to carry out a
additional units of applied research, over and above to the qualifying level
a0
(
θKi ;B
)
.
Intuitively, institutions with weaker reputations are set a higher hurdle
before they are allowed to apply for a grant. An example that fits precisely
this aspect of the optimal policy is the funding for UK doctoral centres in
the social sciences, which is restricted to institutions which had a sufficiently
high reputation, precisely defined as having obtained at least a target score
in the previous research assessment exercise, regardless of the intrinsic merits
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Figure 8: Marginal cost and marginal funding for research grants.
of the application.24 Also, as again can be seen from Figure 4 above, the
optimal policy is such that the amount of research funded by grants is higher
in institutions with the same efficiency θ but better reputation.
Full economic costing
A consequence of (28) is that the amount awarded as a research grant for
a specific project does not cover the additional cost of the project, except
possibly for very high levels of funding. Formally.
Corollary 5 Suppose θKi < θ˜ = θˆ. There exists ∆ > 0 such that there exists
θ∆ < θ
K
i such that g (∆) < c
(
a0
(
θKi ;B
)
+ ∆, θ, B
)− c (a0 (θKi ;B) , θ, B) for
every θ ∈ (θ∆, θKi ).
Graphically, this is illustrated in Figure 8, which is the RHS panel of
Figure 5 for an institution of reputation ` and efficiency parameter θ2. Corol-
lary 5 says that the slope of the solid thick red curve in a neighbourhood of
24More generally, even without a formal bar to apply for grant funding, low reputation
institutions are often hampered by stringent requirements regarding, for example, research
infrastructure and institutional support, and in practice they do receive as research grants
a lower proportion of their funding than institutions carrying out more research.
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aK` (θ2;B, β), given by the dashed line through point X`, which represents the
additional funding received by an institution of type θ2 which exceeds by a
small amount its level of applied research, aK`
(
θKi ;B, β
)
is less than the slope
of the frontier at the same point, the dashed line through point Y`, which
measures the additional cost incurred by such an institution for this increase
in applied research.
In words, the additional funding does not cover the extra cost of grant
funded applied research, which is therefore “co-funded” by the grant funding
agency and the institution. This can be compared with the practice of “full
economic costing”, adopted, among others, by the research councils in the UK
(RCUK/UUK 2010): the amount of funding for a research grant is calculated
to exceed the cost to carry out the research it intends to fund. The rationale
for this mechanism is that the additional funds cover the institution’s fixed
cost, thus avoiding cross-subsidisation among an institution’s activities. My
results here however do not lend support to this rationale. The optimal policy
is more subtle and does entail cross-subsidisation from the block grant to co-
funding specific research projects. This is arguably in line with the principle of
designing incentives to delegate a decision to the economic agents possessing
the private information relevant to that decision.
Finally, note that the argument underlying Corollary 5 does not apply if
curve Ti (a) is concave, and may moreover be reversed for higher values of
applied research: very expensive applied research projects, which are carried
out by very efficient institutions, may require funding that exceeds their cost.
6 Concluding remarks
The aim of this article is to lay a microeconomic foundation for the analysis
of the public funding of research. Its building blocks are an information ad-
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vantage of research institution vis-a`-vis their funders, and the misalignment
in objectives between funders and institutions, the latter, at the optimum,
preferring basic research. I derive a number of theoretical conclusions, which
help to assess the mechanisms used in practice to award government research
funding: for example, institutions that are intrinsically better at applied re-
search ought to receive more funding, not just in absolute terms, which is
natural as they do more research, but per unit of research as well. This is
both because they do more expensive research, and as an incentive payment:
they are rewarded for taking on this more expensive applied research, and
choose to spend this incentive payment on basic research, hence they do more
basic research as well, even though they do not have an absolute advantage
in this activity. They would of course do even more basic research if they also
had an absolute advantage in this activity: modifying the model to allow the
cost of basic research to increase with the idiosyncratic parameter θ would
add algebraic complication but leave the results qualitatively unchanged, pro-
vided that the increase is less steep than for applied research, that is as long
as better institutions have a comparative advantage in applied research.
The model is sufficiently precise to shed light on some of the mechanisms
used in practice to allocate research funding. For example, government agen-
cies typically award research grants on a “cost-plus” principle, whereas charita-
ble bodies require co-funding of research activities. The latter can be justified
on the basis of the analysis of the model, whereas the former cannot. The ar-
ticle also shows that distribution of government funds should depend on past
success: the funding opportunities available to more prestigious institutions
should be wider than those that less prestigious one can draw from.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Divide the government objective function (6) by (1 + λ),
introduce the auxiliary variables Ai andBi, i = 1, . . . , N , defined in (A1b) and (A1c)
as the amount of applied and basic research carried out in i-reputation institutions,
and substitute (9) and the value of T to write the optimization problem as:
max{
{ri(θ),ai(θ)}θ∈[θ,θˆi],Ai,Bi
}N
i=1
A,B
{
Y (A) + k (A+B)
1 + λ
− (A1a)
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θ¯
θ
[
c (ai (θ) , θ, B) + ri (θ)− ai (θ)
]
fi (θ) dθ
}
,
s.t.
∫ θ¯
θ
ai (θ) fi (θ) dθ = Ai, i = 1, . . . , N , (A1b)∫ θ¯
θ
[ri (θ)− ai (θ)] fi (θ) dθ = Bi, i = 1, . . . , N , (A1c)
N∑
i=1
qiAi = A,
N∑
i=1
qiBi = B, (A1d)
ri (θ)− ai (θ) > 0, ai (θ) > 0, i = 1, . . . , N . (A1e)
Ignoring for the moment the constraints (A1e), the Lagrangean for (A1a) is:
L (·) =
N∑
i=1
{
−qi
[
c (ai (θ) , θ, B) + ri (θ)− ai (θ)
]
+ σiai (θ) + (1− βi) (ri (θ)− ai (θ))
}
fi (θ)
+ (1− β)
(
N∑
i=1
qiBi −B
)
+ σ
(
N∑
i=1
qiAi −A
)
, (A2)
where, following Leonard and van Long (1992), σi and (1− βi) are the (constant)
Lagrange multipliers for constraints (A1b) and (A1c). Similarly, σ and (1− β)
are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints in (A1d). I write the multipliers
as (1− βi) and (1− β) to lighten notation. The first order conditions give (see
A1
Leonard and van Long, 1992, Theorem 7.11.1):
∂L
∂ai (θ)
=
{
qi
[
−ca (ai (θ) , θ, B) + 1
]
+ σi − (1− βi)
}
fi (θ) = 0, (A3a)
∂L
∂ri (θ)
= (−qi + (1− βi)) fi (θ) = 0, (A3b)
σi = σqi, (A3c)
(1− βi) = (1− β) qi, (A3d)
each for i = 1, . . . , N , and
σ =
k + Y ′ (A)
1 + λ
. (A4)
(A3b) implies 1− βi = qi, i = 1, . . . , N , and so β = 0 from (A3d). Next, substitute
(A3c) into (A3a), note that the constraint which were ignored, ai (θ) > 0 and
ri (θ) − ai (θ) > 0, are satisfied at this solution whenever θ 6 θ∗. This determines
θˆi = θ
∗ for i = 1, . . . , n. When θ > θ∗, then ai (θ) = 0. Using the same argument
given below, at the end of Proposition 3, I can show that conditions (A3a)-(A3d)
and (A4) are sufficient, and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. The argument which derives (15) establishes (12a).
Consider next the other statements. Clearly bi (θ) must be non-negative, and so
(12d) must hold. Now (12b): following Laffont and Tirole (1993), if
−caθ (ai (x) , θ, B) a˙i (x) > 0, (A5)
then the first order conditions are sufficient for a maximum and the policy is in-
centive compatible. Given my assumption that caθ (ai (x) , θ, B) > 0, (A5) requires
(12b) to hold.
Finally derive (12c). This follows from the observation that total funding must
be decreasing in θ. If it were not the case, then an institution could simply claim
to have a higher θ than it has, thus receiving more funding, which it could spend
A2
on basic research. Therefore
d (c (ai (θ) , θ, B) + ri (θ)− ai (θ))
dθ
6 0. (A6)
Expand (A6):
ca (·) a˙i (θ) + cθ (·) + r˙i (θ)− a˙i (θ) 6 0,
which becomes, using (12a),
[ca (ai (θ) , θ, B)− 1] a˙i (θ) 6 0.
Because a˙i (θ) 6 0, ca (ai (θ) , θ, B) must be greater than or equal to 1, which is
(12c). Finally, as a0 (θ,B) is lower than r˙i (θ) to the left of their intersection, by
Assumption 4.(i), this also determines the boundary condition in (12a).
Proof of Proposition 3. The problem can be rewritten as Problem (A1a) with
the additional constraints (12a), (12b), and (12c) the last replacing the constraints
ai (θ) > 0. The Lagrangean for this problem is the same as (A2), with the following
added terms:
N∑
i=1
{
µi (θ) cθ (ai (θ) , θ, B) + γi (θ)
(
ai (θ)− a0 (θ;B)
)
+ pii (θ) (ri (θ)− ai (θ))
}
,
where µi (θ), γi (θ), and pii (θ) are the multipliers associated respectively to con-
straints (12a), (12c), and (12d). The first order conditions for ri (θ) and ai (θ) are
given by:
− ∂L
∂ri (θ)
= µ˙i (θ) = qifi (θ)− (1− βi) fi (θ)− pii (θ) , µi (θ) = 0, µi
(
θˆi
)
free;
(A7a)
∂L
∂ai (θ)
=
{
−qi [ca (ai (θ) , θ, B)− 1] + σi + (1− βi)
}
fi (θ) + γi (θ)− pii (θ)
− µi (θ) cθa (ai (θ) , θ, B) = 0. (A7b)
A3
As in Problem (A1a), the first order conditions for Ai and Bi give (A3c) and (A3d),
and so (A7a) can be written as
µ˙i (θ) = βqifi (θ)− pii (θ) , µi (θ) = 0, µi
(
θˆi
)
free,
where, as before, (1− β) > 0 and σ > 0 are the multipliers for the constraints in
(A1d). The above has solution:
µi (θ) = βqiFi (θ)−Πi (θ) , (A8)
having defined Πi (θ) =
∫ θ
θ pii (z) dz.
The multipliers β and σ are obtained from the first order conditions for A
and B. The one for A is identical to the one given in Proposition 1, giving again
σ = k+Y
′(A)
1+λ . The one for B is derived in the following Lemma.
Lemma A1
1− β =
k
1+λ −
∑
i qicB (·)Fi
(
θˆi
)
1−∑i ∫ θˆiθ Fi (θ) cθB (·) dθ +
∑
i
∫ θˆi
θ
[
Πi (θ) cθB (·) + γi (θ) caB(·)caa(·)
]
dθ
1−∑i ∫ θˆiθ Fi (θ) cθB (·) dθ .
Proof. Take the first order condition for B, use (A8) and the definition of a0 (θ;B),
which implies ∂a
0
∂B = − caB(·)caa(·) , writing (·) for
(
ai
(
θˆi
)
, θˆi, B
)
:
1−β = k
1 + λ
+
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θˆi
θ
[
−cB (·) fi (θ)− (βFi (θ)−Πi (θ)) cθB (·) + γi (θ) caB (·)
caa (·)
]
dθ.
(A9)
Integration by parts gives:
1− β = k
1 + λ
−
N∑
i=1
qi
{
cB (·)Fi
(
θˆi
)
+ (1− β)
∫ θˆi
θ
Fi (θ) cθB (·) dθ
+
∫ θˆi
θ
[
Πi (θ) cθB (·) + γi (θ) caB (·)
caa (·)
]
dθ
}
,
which gives the Lemma.
A4
Consider now the first order condition for B.
1− β = k
1 + λ
−
N∑
i=1
qi
∫ θ¯
θ
cB (ai (θ) , θ, B) fi (θ) dθ. (A10)
Notice first that β > 0: (1− β) measures the benefit of relaxing the constraint
bi (θ) > 0, which has a cost of 1, measured in the social value of monetary units.
The funding agency can always increase bi (θ) if it wants, because it can simply
increase the funding to all research institutions, and, as at the optimum they all do
at least a0 (θ;B), they all prefer to spend the additional funding on basic research.
Therefore the benefit of increasing any of the bi (θ)’s cannot exceed the cost at the
optimum: (1− β) 6 1. Next I show that β > 0. Suppose by contradiction that
β = 0. Then pii (θ) = Πi (θ) = γi (θ) = 0, and µi (θ) = 0 (from (A8)), so that (A7b)
and (A9) reduce to (10a) and (17). Therefore B is given by B¯, determined in (17).
However, the individual amount of basic research needs also to satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint (12a). By Assumption 5, B¯ violates this requirement, and
this is against the contradiction hypothesis β = 0.
The final set of first order conditions are those for θˆi. They are given by (Leonard
and van Long 1992):
c
(
a0
(
θˆi;B
)
, θˆi, B
)
− σia0
(
θˆi;B
)
=
µi (θ)
fi (θ)
cθ
(
a0
(
θˆi;B
)
, θˆi, B
)
,
which, given µi (θ), determines θˆi. Notice that because ai (θ) is the same for i =
1, . . . , N in a left neighbourhood of θˆi, then θˆi must be the same for all i = 1, . . . , N .
To continue with the proof, return to the first order conditions for ai (θ), and
substitute (A8), (A3c), and (A3d) into (A7b) to rewrite it as:
ca (ai (θ) , θ, B) =
Y ′ (A) + k
1 + λ
+β+
γi (θ)− pii (θ)
qifi (θ)
−βFi (θ)−Πi (θ)
fi (θ)
cθa (ai (θ) , θ, B) .
(A11)
In what follows I consider a fixed i, and drop the subscript i to lighten notation.
A5
Define the function aKΠ (θ;B, β) as the solution in a of
ca (a, θ,B) =
Y ′ (A) + k
1 + λ
+ β − βF (θ)−Π
f (θ)
cθa (a, θ,B) . (A12)
If Π = 0, then aKΠ (θ;B, β) = a
K (θ;B, β) and if Π > 0, then aKΠ (θ;B, β) >
aK (θ;B, β), because cθa (·) > 0.
Next notice that, depending on the combination of complementary slackness
for constraints (12c) and (12d), a value of a (θ) belongs to one of four possible
regions, defined by the pairs of inequality constraints which are satisfied as a strict
inequality.
1. a (θ) − a0 (θ;B) > 0 and r (θ) − a (θ) > 0. Therefore, γ (θ) = pi (θ) = 0,
which means r (θ) > a (θ) > a0 (θ;B), and in this region, r (θ) = r0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
,
a (θ) = aKΠ(θ) (θ;B, β).
2. r (θ)− a (θ) > 0 and γ (θ) > 0. Here, a (θ)− a0 (θ;B) = 0 and pi (θ) = 0, and
so r (θ) = r0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
, a (θ) = a0 (θ;B).
3. a (θ)−a0 (θ;B) > 0 and pi (θ) > 0. In this region γ (θ) = 0 and r (θ) = a (θ) =
r0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
.
4. γ (θ) > 0 and pi (θ) > 0. Here, r (θ) = r0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
= a0 (θ;B) = a (θ), and
therefore this region is just the single intersection point between a0 (θ;B) and
r0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
.
As a preliminary step, I show that
if θ ∈
[
θ, θ˜
)
then a (θ) > 0 and b (θ) > 0;
if θ ∈
[
θ˜, θˆ
]
then a (θ) > 0 and b (θ) = 0.
Proposition 3 requires that θ belongs to region 1, that is that a (θ) < r0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
.
Suppose by contradiction that a (θ) = r0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
. Then b (θ) = 0 in
[
θ, θ˜
]
for
some θ˜ > θ. Notice next that it cannot be θ˜ = θˆ, otherwise b (θ) = 0 in
[
θ, θ¯
]
and
A6
so B = 0, against the Inada Condition, Assumption 2.3.(ii). That is, there is θ˜ < θˆ
such that a (θ) = aKΠ (θ;B, β) < r
0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
in a right neighbourhood of θ˜, with of
course a
(
θ˜
)
= r0
(
θ˜;B, θˆ
)
= aKΠ
(
θ˜;B, β
)
. Now I show that at any intersection
between r0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
and aKΠ (θ;B, β), the latter is less steep than r
0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
, and
thus we obtain a contradiction: if aKΠ (θ;B, β) is less steep than r
0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
then it
must be above it in a right neighbourhood of θ˜.
Lemma A2 aKΠ (θ;B, β) > r
0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
for θ > θ˜.
Proof. To see this, compare aKΠ (θ,B, β) and r
0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
in a right neighbourhood
of their intersection. Because a (θ) is above a0 (θ;B) in
[
θ, θ˜
]
, it must be βF (θ)−
Π (θ) > 0 in
[
θ, θ˜
]
. Next totally differentiate (A12):
[
caa (·) + βF (θ)−Π (θ)
f (θ)
cθaa (·)
]
da+[
caθ (·) + βF (θ)−Π (θ)
f (θ)
cθθa (·) + caθ (·)β d
dθ
(
F (θ)
f (θ)
)]
dθ = 0.
Hence:
∂aKΠ (θ;B, β)
∂θ
= −
caθ (·) + βF (θ)−Π(θ)f(θ) cθθa (·) + caθ (·)β ddθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
caa (·) + βF (θ)−Π(θ)f(θ) cθaa (·)
.
I need to verify that the following holds:
−
caθ (·) + βF (θ)−Π(θ)f(θ) cθθa (·) + caθ (·)β ddθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
caa (·) + βF (θ)−Π(θ)f(θ) cθaa (·)
> −cθ (·) .
By Assumption 4, cθaa (·) > 0, and so I can multiply through and rearrange:
cθ (·) caa (·)− caθ (·)
(
1 +
d
dθ
(
F (θ)
f (θ)
))
>
βF (θ)−Π (θ)
f (θ)
(cθθa (·)− cθaa (·) cθ (·)) .
Again, by Assumption 4, the RHS is positive and the LHS is negative. Therefore,
at their intersection,
∂aKΠ (·)
∂θ >
∂r0(·)
∂θ , that is r
0 (·) is steeper, and so it is below aKΠ (·)
in a right neighbourhood of their intersection.
A7
An implication of the Lemma is that if aKΠ (·) defines the optimal schedule, then
aKΠ (·) = aK (·). This, by (A12), implies c (a (θ) , θ, B) > 1, and so aK (·) > a0 (·),
and θK > θ.
The first order conditions (A7a) and (A7b) are also sufficient, for fixed threshold
θˆ. This follows from Theorem 7.9.1 in Leonard and van Long (1992): the function
in the first line of (A1a) is concave as Y
′′(A)
1+λ < 0, and the functions in (A1d) are
linear and hence concave. The Lagrangen is concave, given that ∂
2L
∂ri(θ)
2 = 0 and
∂2L
∂ai (θ)
2 = −qicaa (ai (θ) , θ, B) fi (θ)− µi (θ) cθaa (ai (θ) , θ, B)
is negative, as caa (·) > 0 by Assumption 2.2, µ (θ) > 0 by (A8), and cθaa (·) > 0 by
Assumption 4.(iii).
The Proposition now follows immediately. Notice that constraint (12b) is satis-
fied, as all three curves a0 (θ;B), aK (θ;B, β) and r0
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
are decreasing in θ.
Proof of Corollary 1. Proposition 3 shows that ai (θ) is one of a
0 (θ;B), aKi (θ;B, β)
or ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
. Moreover, as it must lie between a0 (θ;B) and ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
, it can
only equal aKi (θ;B, β) – intersections excepted – between them. (23) follows from
(22).
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider two reputation groups, h and `, with h > `.
Take the difference in the expressions in (19) for these reputation groups:
ca (ah, ·)− ca (a`, ·) = −β
(
Fh (θ)
fh (θ)
cθa (ah, ·)− F` (θ)
f` (θ)
cθa (a`, ·)
)
,
where, for the sake of brevity, the argument of ai is omitted and “·” stands for
“θ,B”. Add and subtract Fh(θ)fh(θ) cθa (a`, ·) and rearrange:
ca (ah, ·)− ca (a`, ·)
β
+
Fh (θ)
fh (θ)
(cθa (ah, ·)− cθa (a`, ·)) =
(
Fh (θ)
fh (θ)
− F` (θ)
f` (θ)
)
cθa (a`, ·) ;
A8
that is
(
caa (a˜, ·)
β
+
Fh (θ)
fh (θ)
cθaa
(
˜˜a, ·)) (ah − a`) = (Fh (θ)
fh (θ)
− F` (θ)
f` (θ)
)
cθa (a`, ·) , (A13)
where a˜ and ˜˜a are appropriate intermediate value theorem values. In (A13), the
coefficient of (ah − a`) on the LHS is positive by Assumptions 2.2.(i) and 4.(iii); on
the RHS, cθa (a`, ·) > 0, by Assumptions 2.2.(iii), and so the sign of (ah − a`) > 0
equals the sign of the coefficient of cθa (a`, ·) > 0, which is determined by the
following Lemma.
Lemma A3 Assumption 1 implies Fh(θ)fh(θ) >
F`(θ)
f`(θ)
.
Proof. Fh (θ) > F` (θ) implies − lnFh (θ) < − lnF` (θ), which can be written as:
∫ θ¯
θ
d lnFh (x)
dx
dx <
∫ θ¯
θ
d lnF` (x)
dx
dx, (A14)
for every θ ∈ (θ, θ¯). Now use d lnFi(x)dx = fi(x)Fi(x) to write (A14) as
∫ θ¯
θ
fh (x)
Fh (x)
dx <
∫ θ¯
θ
f` (x)
F` (x)
dx for every θ ∈ (θ, θ¯) ,
which implies fh(x)Fh(x) <
f`(x)
F`(x)
, or Fh(x)fh(x) >
F`(x)
f`(x)
, the statement in the Lemma.
This proves the first statement in Proposition 4. The same procedure estab-
lishes the second part, the relationship between reputation and total research: the
difference r˙h (θ)− r˙` (θ) is
r˙h (θ)− r˙` (θ) = −cθ (ah (θ) , ·) + cθ (a` (θ) , ·) = −caθ (a˜, ·) (ah (θ)− a` (θ)) < 0.
The research carried out by an institution of type θ and reputation i is
ri (θ) =
∫ θˆ
θ
r˙i (θ) dθ −
∫ θ
θ
r˙i (θ) dθ, i = 1, . . . , N ,
A9
which implies
rh (θ)− r` (θ) = −
∫ θK`
θ
(r˙h (θ)− r˙` (θ)) > 0,
and establishes the second part of the statement.
Proof of Corollary 2. I continue to omit the subscript i, which does not generate
possible confusion. Differentiate (24) with respect to a, using (12a):
T ′ (a) = ca
(
a, θK (a;B, β) , B
)− 1. (A15)
The above is positive because aKi (θ;B, β) exceeds a
0 (θ;B). T is therefore increas-
ing. For the second part of the statement, expand T ′′ (a):
T ′′ (a) = caa (·) + caθ (·) ∂θ
K (a;B, β)
∂a
.
This is positive if − caθ(·)caa(·) =
∂a0(θ;B)
∂θ >
∂aK(θ;B,β)
∂θ .
Proof of Corollary 3. The derivative of (26) is:
T ′ (a) = ca (·) + cθ (·) ∂θ
0 (a;B)
∂a
+
∂ar
(
θ0 (a;B) ;B, θˆ
)
∂θ
∂θ0 (a;B)
∂a
− 1 = 0,
as ca (·) = 1 along a0 (θ;B).
Proof of Corollary 4. Let θr
(
a;B, θˆ
)
be the inverse function of ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
, and
total funding is given by (recall that b (θ) = 0 in this region):
T (a) = c
(
a, θr
(
a,B, θˆ
)
, B
)
. (A16)
Differentiation with respect to a yields:
T ′ (a) = ca (·) + cθ (·)∂ar(·)
∂θ
= ca (·)− 1.
This is because ar (·) is the inverse of θr (·); the second equality follows from
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the definition of ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
, given in (21), Corollary 1 in the text. Because
ar
(
θ;B, θˆ
)
> a0 (θ;B) except at θˆ, the above is positive in
(
θ˜, θˆ
)
. To establish
convexity, take T ′′ (a):
T ′′ (a) = caa (·) + caθ (·)
∂θr
(
a;B, θˆ
)
∂a
,
which is positive as − caθ(·)caa(·) >
∂ar(θ;B,θˆ)
∂θ = −cθ (·).
For the second part of the statement, note that, in region 3 (that is to the right
of their intersection), the slope of T (a) is ca
(
a, θr
(
a;B, θˆ
)
, B
)
− 1. In region
1, namely to the left of their intersection, the slope is ca
(
a, θK (a;B, β) , B
) − 1.
Consider a right neighbourhood of their intersection: the difference in slope is
ca
(
a, θr
(
a;B, θˆ
)
, B
)
− ca
(
a, θK (a;B, β) , B
)
= caθ (a, θ3, B)
(
θr
(
a;B, θˆ
)
− θK (a;B, β)
)
. (A17)
This is positive, as θr
(
a;B, θˆ
)
− θK (a;B, β) > 0, establishing the statement.
Lemma A4 The tangency point (a2, Ti (a2)) is a local maximum of the indifference
map in the feasible set.
Proof. At the tangency point (a2, Ti (a2)), with a2 = a
K
i (θ2;B, β), the slope of the
indifference curve is given by ca (a2, θ2, B) − 1. The slope of the funding schedule
is given by (A15). In a neighbourhood of a2, we have:
ca (a2 + ε, θ2, B)−ca
(
a2 + ε, θ
K
i (a2 + ε;B, β) , B
)
= caθ (a2 + ε, θ3, B)
(
θ2 − θKi (a2 + ε;B, β)
)
.
For some θ3 in the interval with endpoints θ2 and θ
K
i (a2 + ε;B, β). For ε > 0 (re-
spectively ε < 0), the above is positive (respectively negative), as aKi (·) is decreasing
and so θK (·) is too.
Proof of Corollary 5. Omitted.
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